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Scientific realism holds that scientific theories are approx-
imations of universal truths about reality, whereas scien-
tific instrumentalism posits that scientific theories are in-
tellectual structures that provide adequate predictions of
what is observed and useful frameworks for answering
questions and solving problems in a given domain. These
philosophical perspectives have different strengths and
weaknesses and have been regarded as incommensurate:
Scientific realism fosters theoretical rigor, verifiability,
parsimony, and debate, whereas scientific instrumentalism
fosters theoretical innovation, synthesis, generativeness,
and scope. The authors review the evolution of scientific
realism and instrumentalism in psychology and propose
that the categorical distinction between the 2 is overstated
as a prescription for scientific practice. The authors pro-
pose that the iterative deployment of these 2 perspectives,
just as the iterative application of inductive and deductive
reasoning in science, may promote more rigorous, integra-
tive, cumulative, and useful scientific theories.
Science, as traditionally conceived, is like interrogat-ing the Greek mythological sea demon, Proteus.Poseidon commissioned him with the minor duty of
protecting the seals of the oceans. More pertinent to the
subject of our article is a quality Proteus possessed. He was
omniscient in matters to do with the seas and could also
modify his appearance to anything he wished, any animal,
any plant, and even fire. Although elusive in his various
appearances, it was possible with judicious interrogation
and particularly with the aid of his daughter to extract the
truth from him.
A distinction made in the philosophy of science is
whether theorists seek to discover truths or to create tar-
geted frameworks that provide adequate prediction for
some domain of phenomena and help to solve problems
regarding that limited domain. The characterization of sci-
ence as being like Proteus casts the goal of scientific
theories as being to describe the world as it really is,
independently of human expectations, perceptions, and
measurements. Our aim here is to examine the develop-
ment of scientific realism and instrumentalism in psychol-
ogy and the implications of each for how we think about,
formulate, and evaluate psychological theory.
Scientists are, by and large, a practical lot, and it is
sensible that readers might ask why any of this matters.
Given numerous demands, it is understandable why scien-
tists might adopt measures or methods without thinking
exhaustively about the underlying assumptions of these
operationalizations or how they fit within a broader set.
Such constraints are the stuff of which apocryphal stories
are fashioned by philosophers of science. More than 60
years ago, Eddington (1939), in his book A Philosophy of
the Physical Sciences, told the story of a hypothetical
scientist who sought to study the fish in the seas. The
scientist wove a two-inch mesh net and commissioned a
ship on which to sail the seas. Once on the high seas, this
individual sailed to various sites, lowered the nets, hauled
in a catch, measured and cataloged each fish, returned the
catch to the deep, folded the nets, and sailed to another site
to repeat the procedure. After several years of investiga-
tion, the scientist returned to announce there were no fish
smaller than two inches in the seas. Taking the time to
discuss the measures and methods we use, the underlying
assumptions, their strengths and limitations, and the theo-
retical implications of these operationalizations may pay
dividends in the long term in science.
If the time scientists characteristically take to consider
broadly what their measures mean is the equivalent of a
brief gaze, the time taken by many to think about even
more abstract philosophical issues such as scientific realism
and instrumentalism may be the equivalent of a blink.
Scientists tend to inherit rather than select these perspec-
tives. This was certainly true of ourselves. But an inherited
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scientific perspective, like an inherited telescope, can best
be appreciated for what it does and does not bring into
focus when placed within the context of what other per-
spectives also reveal.
In the present article, therefore, we review the onto-
logical perspectives of scientific realism and instrumental-
ism, noting some of the strengths and weaknesses of
each. We suggest further that the success of calls in recent
years for the reunification of psychology (e.g., Sternberg,
2003) and for multilevel integrative theory and research
(Kessel, Rosenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) may be enhanced
by capitalizing on the strengths of both ontological per-
spectives rather than a return to the hegemony of a single
perspective.
The Emergence of Scientific Realism
and Instrumentalism in Psychology
The scientific method, covered in nearly every introductory
psychology textbook and preached in psychological meth-
ods courses, consists of observation and description of
specific aspects of phenomenon or group of phenomena
(e.g., processes, behaviors) in terms of a general model or
theory, the formulation of a hypothesis to predict the exis-
tence of other phenomena or to predict quantitatively the
results of new observations (e.g., a causal or mathematical
relation), the performance of experimental study or system-
atic observation and statistical analyses to rest the predic-
tions, and the interpretation of empirical results to confirm,
reject, or revise the theory (see Figure 1). Theory is an
abstraction that resides in the conceptual domain, whereas
scientific operationalizations, experiments, and data are
concrete and exist in the empirical domain. The scientific
method relies on both deduction and induction, each in
turn, to develop comprehensive scientific accounts of phe-
nomena. Within the conceptual domain, two philosophical
approaches have influenced mainstream psychological the-
ory: scientific realism and scientific instrumentalism.
Scientific Realism
Scientific realism holds that scientific theories go beyond
data to posit the existence of nonobservable entities—such
as quarks, mental representations, and social cognition—
which actually exist (Thagard, 2002). According to scien-
tific realists, the product of successful scientific research is
knowledge that is independent of theory or methodology
(although theories may still be useful devices to organize
this knowledge). Psychological theories grounded in the
philosophy of realism attempt to describe the world as it
really is—independent of human theories, perceptions, or
measurements—and to establish what actually exists in it.
The depiction of science as akin to mythical Proteus falls
squarely within the camp of scientific realism.
Positivism, a form of scientific realism that impacted
psychology for decades, was described initially by Auguste
Comte, who argued that humankind has seen three major
phases in its search for understanding: the theological
phase involving a search for God and spirituality, the
metaphysical phase involving the search for philosophical
truths, and the scientific phase involving the search for
facts (Lenzer, 1975). Comte characterized the latter as a
search for positive truths that came from the collection of
facts and the application of logic independently of human
perceptions and conceptions. Positivism further posited
that there were no ultimate differences among the sciences
and that the same methods for studying truths about physics
or chemistry applied to psychology.
Early theoreticians in psychology adopted the position
of scientific realism in part because of the laudable goal of
building legitimate scientific theories of psychological phe-
nomena by emulating what they thought physical scientists
did (e.g., Watson, 1913; Wundt, 1909/1912). Scientific
realism received additional impetus in psychology when a
group of philosophers known as the Vienna Circle adopted
positivism (or what came to be termed logical positivism)
in the 1920s as the formula to follow if psychology were to
become an acceptable science (see Ayer, 1936; Bergmann,
1957). In logical positivism, a statement can be true only if
it is a self-evident analytical, deductive truth as is found in
mathematics and formal logic or if the statement describes
reality precisely. Thus, the statements “Operant perfor-
mance established by higher reinforcement-ratio schedules
extinguishes more rapidly than those established by lower
ratio schedules” and “The hippocampus plays a crucial role
in spatial learning” are meaningful theoretical statements
because we can measure the stimuli and responses and test
the proposed relation between them, whereas statements
such as “Happiness is a measure of national well-being”
and “Stress leads to allostatic load” were thought not to be
meaningful because the concepts are vague and therefore
difficult to verify. Positivism represented fertile ground for
the growth of behaviorism, which argued that a science of
psychology should focus only on that which could be
observed because only phenomena that could be observed
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could be measured objectively and reliably (Watson, 1913).
Movements were viewed as appropriate subject matter
for theories in psychology, but feelings and mentation
were not.
Given this backdrop, it became fashionable in early
psychology to emulate theory construction in the physical
sciences by modeling the structure and form of their for-
mulations after the certainties and invariants of Newtonian
physics. In his highly influential Handbook of Experimen-
tal Psychology, for instance, Stevens (1951) advised
The scientist is usually looking for invariance whether he knows
it or not. Whenever he discovers a functional relation between two
variables his next question follows naturally: under what condi-
tions does it hold? The quest for invariant relations is essentially
the aspiration for generality, and in psychology, as in physics, the
principles that have wide application are those we prize. (p. 20)
Despite the early belief that the realist’s approach
characterized the physical sciences, whether theory and
practice in physics are entirely compatible with the doctrine
of scientific realism has been debated for quite some time.
For example, gas has long been conceived as a discontin-
uous medium when explaining thermal behavior but as a
continuous medium when explaining acoustic behavior.
Because nothing can be both continuous and discontinuous,
at least one of these characterizations must be false
(Chalmers, 1999). As a second example, Newtonian phys-
ics offers a parsimonious account of the behavior of gross
physical phenomena, but quantum mechanics is a more
comprehensive theory because it also explains the behavior
of nuclei, atoms, molecules, and matter in the solid state.
This is because the kind of certainty seen in Newtonian
mechanics is not possible in quantum phenomena: The
initial state of a particle cannot be established with suffi-
cient accuracy, and the more that is known about its posi-
tion now, the less is known about its momentum and hence
its position later (Beiser, 2003). The quantities explored in
quantum mechanics, like those in psychology, are proba-
bilities, not certainties. Yet Newtonian mechanics contin-
ues to be used in some areas of physics.
Scientific realism, through the work of the logical
positivists, nevertheless has a number of strengths that led
to advances in psychological theory and method. First, it
contributed to the content of theory in psychology being
reducible to the truths of logic and mathematics coupled
Figure 1
The Scientific Method and the Cyclic Application of Induction and Deduction
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with propositions referring to sense experience—that is, to
the notion that psychological theory should be subjected to
empirical verification.
Second, scientific realists (e.g., Hacking, 1983) argued
that theoretical statements about phenomena one cannot
observe by traditional empirical standards can be rendered
observable by extending the range of our senses through
the use of new instruments and procedures whose justifi-
cation is theory dependent. Thus, scientific realism under-
scored the importance of the development of new methods
for psychological theory: As knowledge of unobservable
psychological phenomena (initially theoretical constructs)
and instrumental design improves, it becomes possible to
detect and measure psychological phenomena previously
beyond the reach of reliable detection and measurement.
Third, scientific realism emphasized the importance of
a priori hypotheses, preferably embedded within a broader
theoretical formulation, to guide empirical observation
(McGuire, 1973, 1999). Fourth, realism emphasized that
the purpose of empiricism in psychological theory was to
test whether the knowledge representation is true. When
multiple explanations for a phenomenon existed, scientific
realism maintained that at most only one of the conflicting
hypotheses and theories could be true. Accordingly, scien-
tific realism promotes theoretical specification, differentia-
tion, warfare, and parsimony.
Fifth, scientific realists, in response to criticisms of
underdetermination, expanded the notion that the explana-
tory power of a theory is defined by its predictive power. A
theory among a set of theories that makes the same empir-
ical predictions may be preferred because it explains ob-
servable phenomena better than others—where better one
might mean generativeness and scope. Thus, a theory that
produced a novel prediction is to be preferred over one
developed later to account for the observation.
Finally, the realist approach encourages paradigmatic
development that may be unique to adherents who are
deeply committed to the truth of their guiding formulation.
Behaviorism in American psychology was certainly char-
acterized by deeply committed adherents who pushed the
boundaries of their guiding theories beyond what less com-
mitted adherents would have achieved.
Scientific realism also has its downside, of course.
Scientific realism can be characterized as outcome driven
in that it seeks to arrive at a conception that the theorist
regards as the truth; once discovered, this truth/outcome is
defended against all competitors. The disadvantage is that
it can impede progress and encourage defensiveness of and
commitment to a theory well beyond its utility. That is,
theoretical battles not only may eliminate the chaff in a
scientific field, they may also savage worthwhile formula-
tions that are less developed, more innovative, less vigor-
ously promoted, or maintained by scientists with less po-
litical clout. As a result, realism can leave in its wake the
ruins of worthwhile beginnings and the lost utility of the-
ories that have fallen out of fashion. Newtonian mechanics
remains a vital theory, because it remains a useful approx-
imation of gross phenomena in its domain, and a similar
defense has been offered for rational choice theory in
economics in the behavioral domain. If scientific realism
does not constitute a strong philosophical basis for such
theorizing, what might?
Scientific Instrumentalism
We began by noting that psychological science as con-
ceived in the 20th century is like interrogating the sea
demon, Proteus, in an effort to discover the truth. The
perspective of scientific instrumentalism holds that the
judicious interrogation of Proteus would be valuable even
were the sea demon not to know truth but only knowledge
that would help solve the problems of his interrogators.
According to scientific instrumentalism, the aim of scien-
tific theories is not to discover truth but rather to produce
intellectual structures that provide adequate predictions of
what is observed and useful frameworks for answering
questions and solving problems in a given domain (Tha-
gard, 2002; Van Fraassen, 2002). From this philosophical
perspective, scientific theory represents convenient intel-
lectual structures for predicting or describing in more ab-
stract terms observable data, not actual structures in the
world. In the view of instrumentalists, rational choice the-
ory in economics, arousal theory in psychology, and New-
tonian mechanics in physics each represents an important
theoretical structure because they continue to provide a
simple explanation for dealing with gross phenomena in its
domain even though none is sufficient alone to explain
what we now know about behavior in these domains.
Whereas the perspective of scientific realism fosters
theoretical specification, empiricism, verification, discrim-
ination, and warfare between competing theories, the per-
spective of scientific instrumentalism promotes open-mind-
edness, creativity, integration, consilience, and problem
solving (see Figure 2). This distinction is evident in the
languages of science, which Wegner (2003) characterized
Gu¨n R. Semin
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as debate (“Victory!”) or discovery (“Eureka!”). If the
realist could be characterized as debater, warrior, and out-
come driven (i.e., the search for and battles over universal
truths), the instrumentalist could be characterized as diplo-
mat, discoverer, and process driven (i.e., the search for
locally useful intellectual structures).
The perspective of scientific instrumentalism in psy-
chology owes much to the writings of Popper (1959),
originally a member of the Vienna Circle, who grew to
question some of the assumptions of logical positivism and
emerged as one of its earliest critics. Popper argued that
scientific discovery should proceed in four stages: the for-
mal stage (theory checked for internal consistency), the
semiformal stage (propositions with empirical conse-
quences are separated from those that are not), the com-
parison stage (the theory is compared with extant theories
that seek to explain the same phenomena, and any that do
not expand on the explanatory power of the extant theories
should be abandoned), and the empirical testing stage (all
else equal, hypotheses least likely to be true should be
tested, as these are the most likely to reveal theoretical
flaws and foster theoretical advancement). Although not a
scientific instrumentalist, Popper reasoned that the empha-
sis on verifiability in logical positivism produced a confir-
matory bias in theory construction and testing. Popper
argued that evidence consistent with a theory did not pro-
vide much scientific support because most theories are
constructed by bringing together known cases and deriving
generalizations that cover them. Evidence consistent with a
theory should therefore be easy to find by simply seeking
more of the same. There was little incentive in positivism
to test novel predictions or bold conjectures, he reasoned.
Positivism in essence fostered a prevention over a promo-
tion focus in scientific theories, with the effect being that
theoretical innovation and generativeness were suppressed.
The evolution of cognitive dissonance theory, first
proposed by Festinger (1957), illustrates both the impor-
tance Popper (1959) placed on bold conjectures in science
and the resistance by adherents of a theory to abandon it
even when disconfirmed. Cognitive dissonance theory was
fueled during the 1960s and 1970s by a family of nonob-
vious predictions (bold conjectures) that were derived and
confirmed. Among these predictions were that low mone-
tary incentives to perform a counterattitudinal behavior are
Figure 2
The Contrasting Perspectives of Scientific Realism and Instrumentalism
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more persuasive than are high incentives (Festinger &
Carlsmith, 1959), mild threats produce greater devaluations
of the forbidden object or activity than severe threats
(Aronson & Carlsmith, 1963), high effort produces more
liking of what it is that one worked to achieve than low
effort (Aronson & Mills, 1959), and low credible sources
produce greater agreement than high credible sources
(Cooper, Darley, & Henderson, 1974). Greenwald and col-
leagues (e.g., Greenwald, 1975; Greenwald, Pratkanis,
Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1986), however, have also argued
that dissonance theorists refused to abandon cognitive dis-
sonance theory even after fundamental predictions were
falsified. They noted instead that auxiliary hypotheses—
such as an attitude-discrepant behavior inducing cognitive
dissonance only if the actor was personally responsible for
the behavior and the consequences of the behavior were
negative and foreseeable—were proposed that insulated the
original theory from falsification.
This history is not unique to research on behaviorism,
cognitive dissonance, or even psychology. Kuhn (1970; see
also Hanson, 1958) criticized the notion that scientists were
imaginative, skeptical, and pioneering, arguing instead that
most scientists are hesitant to depart from the security of a
shared understanding of a phenomenon and prior agree-
ments on the appropriate methods for its study. It is only
when sufficient empirical anomalies accrue that a new and
radically different paradigm is likely to develop. Kuhn
further reasoned that the old paradigm is never shown to be
wrong but interest in it simply dwindles over time as fewer
and fewer experiments are conducted within its frame of
reference. Perceptual approaches to attitude theories such
as variable perspective theory (Ostrom & Upshaw, 1968)
and social judgment theory (Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall,
1965), for instance, are rarely seen in the contemporary
literature even though they continue to reveal new and
interesting effects (Cacioppo, Andersen, Turnquist, &
Tassinary, 1989; Epley & Gilovich, 2001; Fazio, Zanna, &
Cooper, 1977). Finally, Kuhn suggested that the meaning
of a psychological theory is intimately intertwined with the
overarching paradigm in which it is developed.
Many of the notions Kuhn (1970) discussed are evi-
dent in the recent emergence of cognitive and social neu-
rosciences. One of the pioneers of cognitive neuroscience,
Kosslyn (1999), suggested that brain imaging is particu-
larly helpful when it is used to address one of two broad
classes of questions—How are information-processing sys-
tems implemented in neural tissue? and When are specific
types of information processing used? Questions of the
former type include (a) Which areas implement systems
that confer specific functions? (b) Which areas implement
“simple systems” (linked operations)? (c) What operation
is performed by a specific brain area? (d) Which are the
properties of structures that underlie a particular ability?
and (e) Is there more than one way in which a function can
be performed? whereas questions about when specific types
of information processing are used include (a) What pro-
cesses can be inferred from the presence of activation? (b)
Do variations in activation predict performance? (c) How
does processing change with practice? (d) How does pro-
cessing change with context? and (e) How does processing
depend on the goal and the prior sequence of processing?
As these questions suggest, the development of brain-
imaging techniques has made it possible to develop and test
psychological theories based on what is known about the
structure, properties, and operations of specific brain re-
gions and systems of brain regions. What is known about
the structure, properties, and operations of specific brain
regions, in turn, is changing as research and theories in the
field unfold.
Kosslyn’s (1999) critique, as is evident from the pre-
ceding list of questions, also underscores the notion that
there is no general methodological procedure that is best
for understanding all psychological phenomena. This no-
tion is an explicit feature of Feyerabend’s (1975) philoso-
phy for constructing or evaluating scientific theories. Fey-
erabend began his career as a scientific realist but over time
rejected this perspective in favor of a form of instrumen-
talism he called relativism, which emphasized the value of
constructing as many theories as possible about the same
phenomenon (theoretical pluralism). He further argued that
rather than comparing theories as Popper (1959) had ad-
vocated, theoreticians should recognize that all forms of
theories are worthwhile and the key is to evaluate the
relative informativeness of each theory. Thus, Feyera-
bend’s philosophy for constructing or evaluating theories in
psychology not only held that there is no general method-
ological procedure for all science but also that scientific
theories and methods provide useful ways of thinking about
phenomena, not revelations of truths. During the drive-
versus-incentive wars in the middle of the 20th century,
Bolles (1967) emphasized in his influential volume Theory
of Motivation that contrasting drive and incentive theories
may not be the best strategy. Rather, he suggested that
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drive and incentive theories merely represent alternative
conceptual frameworks for viewing motivated behavior,
and their ultimate utility is dependent on which perspective
is shown to be more useful. The demise of drive theories
and the modern incantation of incentive theories relate to
the greater facility of the latter to relate to cognitive con-
structs such as attention.
Given the fundamental claim of logical positivism that
science is the search for truths, reviewers might hold that
they are justified in criticizing a grant proposal or psycho-
logical formulation for not adopting a preferred level of
analysis, methodology, or theoretical approach. Feyera-
bend’s (1975) philosophical perspective explicitly chal-
lenged this scientific practice and demanded instead that
one think about each theory or approach in its own terms.
This does not mean that anything goes or that there are no
criteria by which one can evaluate psychological theory.
Both scientific realists and instrumentalists characterize
science as an organized, systematic interrogation with the
aid of diverse means to gather knowledge about the world
and the compression of this knowledge through abstraction
into testable hypotheses. A general scientific hypothesis
that has a body of empirical support constitutes a scientific
law, and a logically closely interconnected set of scientific
laws constitutes a scientific theory.
McGuire (McGuire 1973, 1999) also recognized log-
ical positivism initially advanced psychological theory and
methods but criticized its influence in contemporary psy-
chological theory and research practice. He proposed what
he termed perspectivism, a formulation that follows Fey-
erabend’s (1975) arguments for scientific instrumentalism.
McGuire (1983, 1999) argued that empiricism should be
the basis of psychological methods and theory but dis-
agreed that the purpose of such empiricism is to test
whether a hypothesis and its theoretical explanation are
“true.” McGuire (1983, 1999) instead emphasized the gen-
erative features of psychological theory and emphasized
the creation of new knowledge by revealing the pattern of
contexts in which the hypothesis receives support and why.
The approaches articulated by Feyerabend and by McGuire
(1983, 1999) imply that what might appear to be an invari-
ant principle or relationship in psychology, as in the phys-
ical sciences (e.g., gas as a continuous vs. discontinuous
medium), may be valid only within a limited range or
specifiable contexts. Such formulations can nevertheless
serve as a valuable explanatory structure if its range of
validity is specified. The simple identity (force  mass 
acceleration) describes a relationship that is invariant in the
macroworld but not in the microworld of physics (Beiser,
2003). According to perspectivism, the quest for universals
or invariant functional relations in psychology should not
obfuscate the possibility that a functional relationship be-
tween variables may not generalize across all domains. It
would be perfectly acceptable and useful to a scientific
instrumentalist if a psychological theory predicted what is
observed within specific empirical domains but not within
others.
Further, according to scientific instrumentalists, the
recognition that theories may have limited ranges of valid-
ity could minimize futile theoretical extensions or rejec-
tions. A historical example can be found in Lindsley’s
(1952) theory of arousal. Lindsley proposed arousal as a
neurobehavioral construct with many of the predicted cog-
nitive and behavioral effects that can now be found in
arousal-based psychological theories (see review by Ca-
cioppo, Berntson, & Crites, 1996). Lindsley’s theory, how-
ever, was built on the large differences he observed in
electroencephalography (EEG) frequency across the behav-
ioral states of death, coma, deep sleep, light sleep, drows-
iness, relaxed wakefulness, alert attentiveness, and excited
emotion. EEG activation is indeed zero in death, low fre-
quency in coma, somewhat higher frequency in sleep, and
so forth. That is, Lindsley’s theory is valid within this
broad behavioral context. The phenomena that psycholog-
ical theories address, however, do not tend to appear in
many of these behavioral states (e.g., death, coma), and the
functional relation between cognition/behavior and EEG
activity that was observed by Lindsley evaporates when the
behavioral range is restricted to those in which one tends to
find waking cognition and behavior. Misapplications of
arousal in psychological theories (see Lacey, 1967) might
have been avoided had the notion that Lindsley’s arousal
theory might have a limited range of application been
recognized.
Finally, the instrumentalist’s argument is that the rec-
ognition that psychological theories may have limited
ranges of validity may promote comprehensive formula-
tions. Decades of empirical research that attempted to pit
Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory against
Bem’s (1972) self-perception theory produced a volumi-
nous literature with no theoretical resolution (Greenwald,
1975). Fazio et al.’s (1977) resolution of this dispute was
achieved by identifying unique empirical domains in
which each made accurate predictions and a moderator
variable that determined when cognitive dissonance pro-
cesses operated and when self-perception processes oper-
ated. As noted above, however, scientific instrumentalism
can lead to epistemological anarchy and has significant
disadvantages.
The Need for an Integrative Approach in
Psychological Theory
No longer simply a collection of independent subspecialties
based on historical distinctions, psychology in the 21st
century represents a multidisciplinary science. The emer-
gent property of the human mind can be thought of as the
magic of the symphony, with the biological substrates
analogous to musical instruments, the information-process-
ing operations analogous to the musical score, and the
orchestration of these production components and the mod-
ulation by the social context as analogous to the conductor
and musicians and the influences of the symphony hall
itself. The neurosciences dimension in psychology is con-
cerned with biological substrates, the cognitive sciences
dimension with information processing elements and oper-
ations, and the social sciences dimension with the orches-
tration of the selection and activation of these elements and
their modulation by the social context.
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The mind is also a moving target, underscoring the
importance of two additional cross-cutting dimensions.
Early in life, growth trajectories and critical developmental
stages provide an opportunity to examine the human mind
as it is being built. Later in life, the deterioration of sub-
strates, operations, and orchestrations provides a glimpse of
the role each play in the human mind. For an unfortunate
few, accidents and disease at random moments in life
compromise substrates, operations, and orchestrations—
providing invaluable converging information on the role of
specific elements in the human mind. The first of these
dimensions—the study of the nature and influence of
changes in substrates, operations, and orchestrations over
the lifespan—represents a developmental sciences dimen-
sion, and the second of these dimensions—the investiga-
tion of the causes and consequences of failures in sub-
strates, operations, and orchestrations—represents a
clinical sciences dimension.
Although the in-depth study of instruments, scores,
and conductors, their changes over time, and the cause and
consequences of failures of each is essential, one cannot
achieve a comprehensive understanding of the symphony
by study of any single element alone. None holds the truth
of the symphony. Reductionism, or the breaking apart of
nature into its natural constituents, is a proven approach in
scientific inquiry. Reductionism is not substitutionism,
however (Berntson & Cacioppo, in press; see also Kruglan-
ski, in press). Reductionism provides points of entry into
complex systems, with the reason for such an entry being
not simply to describe the parts but to develop a better
intellectual model of the complex system:
Complexity is what interests scientists in the end, not simplicity.
Reductionism is the way to understand it . . . but dissection and
analysis are not all that scientists do. Also crucial are synthesis
and integration, tempered by philosophical reflection on signifi-
cance and value. (Wilson, 1998, p. 54)
Thus, understanding the symphony, as well as the precise
role of each element in the production of the magic of the
symphony, is fostered by study of these elements in isola-
tion, in various combinations, and as a whole.
Psychological theory in the 21st century is facing a
similar challenge, with neither scientific realism nor instru-
mentalism ideally suited to this task. As noted above, the
strengths of the realist’s approach is theoretical specifica-
tion, empiricism, verification, discrimination, parsimony,
and rigor, whereas its weaknesses are the zero-sum men-
tality about theory (which include confirmatory biases),
defensiveness, and oversimplification. The perspective of
scientific instrumentalism, in contrast, promotes creativity,
discovery, integration, scope, consilience, and problem
solving, but at the expense of contest, precision, parsimony,
and rigor.
Scientific Symbiosis
Scientific realism and instrumentalism represent such dif-
ferent approaches to scientific theory that they have been
viewed as incommensurable perspectives. The categorical
distinction between scientific realism and instrumentalism
may be overstated as a prescription for scientific practice,
however. An important implication of this review is that
post hoc concepts, local microtheories, and pragmatic or-
ganizational schema will necessarily have an instrumental
quality to them. We would suggest, however, that the
ultimate goal should be to approach or approximate scien-
tific realism. Some may suggest that neither is likely or
even possible. But the instrumental quality of what could
be called local science can be mitigated by expanding the
generality, enriching the supporting empirical database,
modifying the theory to accommodate new or contradictory
findings, and confirming bold predictions. Of particular
importance in this regard is the linking of concepts to other
domains or disciplines—which have their own representa-
tions of putative reality. To the extent that such elaborated
theories, representing multiple levels of organization and
analysis, cohere with physiology, anatomy, sociology, and
so forth, there is an increasing probability that it is pointing
to some set of phenomena that have a lawful relation to
reality and that have generality beyond a local instrumental
perspective. We may never really achieve a true scientific
realism, but the pursuit confers great benefits on an instru-
mental approach, from the standpoint of generality, inte-
gration with other sciences, and the emphasis on the em-
pirical rather than sociopolitical aspects of the scientific
enterprise as the judge of theoretical and methodological
merit. In this way, psychologists might recognize the issues
with and limitations of scientific realism without falling
victim to a shallow instrumentalism.
Our proposal, therefore, is quite simple. Although
philosophers may debate whether scientific realism or in-
strumentalism is best, as a practical lot scientists need not
decide between the two but rather can capitalize on the
strengths of each by adopting each perspective in an iter-
ative fashion, to guide theory and research. In the scientific
method (Figure 1), the apparently incommensurable pro-
cesses of induction and deduction reflect this iterative pro-
cess. Within the conceptual domain of psychological the-
ory, we propose that theorists should adopt the approach of
a scientific realist and a scientific instrumentalist in an
iterative, integrative fashion to guide theory and research
(see Figure 3). In the construction and testing of psycho-
logical theory, there is a role for the warrior and for the
diplomat, for the debater and for the discoverer, because
these combined forces have the potential to enrich psycho-
logical theory and problem solving.
The tension between and iterative deployment of the
perspectives of scientific realism and instrumentalism may
be as integral to a useful, adaptable, integrative, and cu-
mulative theory in psychology as is the tension between the
iteratively deployed processes of deduction and induction.
In the proposed scientific symbiotic perspective, levels of
analysis, paradigms, and theories no longer represent im-
perialistic empires but individual members of a community
who are accorded station based on the specialized exper-
tise, abilities, and problem-solving capacities they bring to
the community of science. Those members who are pro-
saic, redundant, or illegitimate fall to the rigors of parsi-
mony, whereas those who are limited, quirky, but useful
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are accorded a place in the community. Viewed from this
perspective, psychologists may have as important a role to
play in creating public policy (i.e., helping to solve societal
problems with local theories) as economists, sociologists,
and political scientists, especially if psychological theories
and their implications for public policy are evaluated in
terms of their explanatory and problem-solving power in
the face of public needs rather than in terms of their truth
or falsity.
Conclusion
Scientific realism and instrumentalism have incommensu-
rable epistemological features, prescriptions for scientific
practice, and methodological implications. Although it may
not be sensible to view a psychological phenomenon, the-
ory, or method from both perspectives simultaneously, we
have suggested it is possible and productive to view them
from each perspective in an iterative and ongoing fashion,
not unlike the practice with inductive and deductive rea-
soning in psychological theory and research. Specifically,
the world view and language of scientific realism and
instrumentalism are incompatible, but it may be useful for
the psychological scientist to become “bilingual and bicul-
tural.” The advantage that this bestows is that one may
apply the strength of each perspective while continually
checking for its weaknesses and limitations in one’s theory
and research. Thus, incommensurability is often considered
an insurmountable problem in terms of strict adherence to
the one or other team’s game rules (rules of science). But
if illuminating a phenomenon (whether a process or an
outcome) from diverse angles becomes the goal (as in the
classic example of gas being treated as a discontinuous
medium when explaining thermal behavior but as a con-
tinuous medium when explaining acoustic behavior), then
one does not have to take sides, as long as one masters the
languages of both, because each perspective yields an
insight converging on a better theoretical understanding
and empirical study of the phenomenon.
In sum, the dichotomy between scientific realism and
instrumentalism should be assigned to history, and the
respective merits of each concept should be reevaluated
with regard to the implications of each for how we think
about, formulate, and evaluate psychological theory. The
perspective of scientific symbiosis offers an alternative.
Replacing the old dichotomy between scientific realism and
instrumentalism with a multiangled perspective may also
Figure 3
Scientific Symbiosis: The Cyclic Application of Scientific Realism and Instrumentalism in the Development,
Evaluation, Refinement, and Synthesis of Psychological Theories
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provide guidance for and promotion of the role of psychol-
ogy in the formulation of public policy.
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